Africa's Net-Zero Ambition is Not Cheap. Who Will Pay the Price?

By Michael O. Dioha and Lily Odarno

Africa stands at a critical crossroad. Though the continent is least responsible for the climate crisis it is the most exposed to its consequences. At the same time, countries on the continent must navigate the dual burden of lifting millions out of energy poverty while embracing an ambitious clean-energy future. A recent study published in Environmental Research Letters, Exploring Net-Zero Emissions Pathways for Africa Across Different Timelines employs integrated assessment modeling to address a question many African policymakers grapple with: What is the true cost of a net-zero future for Africa, and what is the optimal timeline for this goal?

The researchers apply the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM), one of the world's most widely used integrated assessment tools, to model three alternative futures: net-zero by 2050 (NZ50), net-zero by 2070 (NZ70), and net-zero by 2100 (NZ100). Each scenario carries profoundly different implications for energy, land, water, food, and economic cost.

Business as usual is alarming

According to the study, without new climate action, Africa's net CO₂ emissions could rise nearly six-fold, from 1.8 gigatonnes per year in 2020 to a staggering 10.4 gigatonnes per year by 2100 - equivalent to roughly one-quarter of today’s total global CO₂ emissions. In this BAU scenario, fossil fuels dominate the primary energy supply, accounting for roughly 57% of the total energy mix on average across the century. This trajectory is inconsistent with global climate goals and catastrophic for a continent where climate change is already shrinking per capita GDP by 5 to 15%, with potential losses reaching 16 to 64% by 2030 under high-warming scenarios.

Renewables will play an important role

Across all net-zero scenarios, renewable energy becomes the backbone of Africa's energy system. Over the period 2020 to 2100, renewables account for an average annual share of 49 to 53% of primary energy in net-zero cases, displacing fossil fuels substantially. In the most ambitious scenario, NZ50, renewables, driven overwhelmingly by sustainable biomass, supply nearly 59% of primary energy by 2050. But here is the catch: no net-zero scenario fully eliminates fossil fuels by the end of the century. Some fossil fuel use persists even in the late 2000s in all pathways, meaning carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies are indispensable for closing the gap. Africa's CCS landscape remains nascent, with only a handful of pilot projects existing, mostly in South Africa, and barriers remain high in terms of cost, infrastructure, and regulatory readiness. Our model assumes these barriers are overcome (which demands urgent policy action now). The heavy reliance on bioenergy also warrants caution. The study acknowledges that large-scale bioenergy deployment poses serious socio-economic and ecological risks, potential land conflicts, limited institutional capacity for implementing bioenergy with carbon capture & storage (BECCS) at scale, and underdeveloped carbon markets.

The food price shock nobody is talking about

Pursuing a net-zero agenda in Africa could have dire implications for food security. As land is redirected from food crops toward biomass production and reforestation, cropland availability shrinks. Under all net-zero scenarios, average annual cropland allocation declines by 29 to 31% relative to BAU. This limits food production, leading to higher prices. In the NZ50 scenario, the average annual price of staple foods (corn, rice, and wheat) reaches $1.16 per kilogram, roughly 96% higher than the BAU average. The impact is most acute in Western Africa, where staple food costs more than double compared to the BAU scenario. This could exacerbate Africa’s food insecurity challenge. About 20% of Africans experience chronic hunger, compared to just 10% globally. A near-doubling of staple food prices in pursuit of climate action could be devastating for the continent's most vulnerable, predominantly low-income, rural communities who spend a disproportionate share of income on food. Delaying net-zero targets results in moderate impacts on food security. Under the NZ100 scenario food price increase to around 87% above BAU, as the more gradual timeline allows the agricultural sector to adapt more gradually to land requirements for the net-zero agenda. Ultimately no net-zero pathway circumvents the food tradeoff between increased biomass use and increased food prices.

The price of carbon depends on the speed of transformation

According to the analysis, the average carbon price is $78/tCO₂ in NZ50, $73/tCO₂ in NZ70, and $68/tCO₂ in NZ100 signaling the economic cost of each timeline. Faster transitions require higher implicit costs because there's less time for infrastructure turnover and technology cost reductions. Early climate action could be costlier in the short term, but it avoids locking in carbon-intensive infrastructure and keeps long-term climate impact in check. Delayed action reduces immediate burdens but accumulates higher cumulative emissions.

For African countries, the key policy question is therefore not simply whether to price carbon, but how to prevent the cost of transition from falling disproportionately on households, farmers, workers, and small businesses.

That requires financing and policy scaffolding that actually moves capital and protects people. Rather than relying on mechanisms that have so far delivered too little, African transition plans need concessional finance, grants for adaptation and social protection, guarantees that lower the cost of capital, debt relief where fiscal space is constrained, high-integrity carbon markets that pay fairly for African removals, and domestic industrial policy that gives local firms and workers a stake in the build-out. For fiscally constrained states and hydrocarbon exporters like Nigeria and Angola, a robust later pathway may be more effective than an unfunded 2050 pledge. The priority should be early subsidy reform, transition finance, and clear plans for oil- and gas-dependent assets, workers, and revenues. For the everyday African, this implicit carbon pricing shows up at the fuel pump, in the minibus fare, at the fertilizer shop, and in electricity tariffs. Climate finance can help build clean infrastructure, but household cushioning requires domestic policy tools such as targeted cash transfers, lifeline tariffs, public transport support, and temporary food or fertilizer support. The 2023 fuel-subsidy removal in Nigeria and the protests that followed Kenya’s Finance Bill  showed the risks of reforms that raise costs without protecting vulnerable households.  

What does this mean for Africa's policymakers? 

This study highlights the real trade-offs that could accompany net-zero strategies in Africa. Thus, Africa's policymakers must grapple with what these trade-offs and what they mean in practice. The paper suggests an intermediate timeline, perhaps the 2060's or 2070's, as aggressive yet more domestically attainable. Countries like Nigeria have already chosen 2060 as their net-zero target date. This study is intended to provide an analytical basis for pragmatic choices about energy transition pathways in African countries. What is non-negotiable, regardless of timeline, is the need for integrated planning: energy, agriculture, water, and food systems cannot be decarbonized in silos. International climate finance and technology transfer are equally non-negotiable. Achieving net-zero in Africa will require investment that most African countries cannot mobilize alone. Given Africa's minimal historical contribution to global emissions and its massive development needs, the continent cannot afford to build its net-zero future around aspirational external pledges alone. The priority must be to invest in domestic structural growth: reliable power systems, productive industries, resilient food systems, and climate solutions that are technically feasible, affordable, and aligned with national development priorities. Africa’s net-zero clock may be ticking, but the bill, through higher food prices, water stress, and land competition, must not be paid by those who can least afford it.